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T

Introduction

definition ultimately proved to the Court’s advantage and probably sped the ratification of the Statute.
On the question of aggression, the other permanent members
of the Security Council, as well as some other countries, have
maintained some of the United States’ preferred positions, but
have become increasingly isolated. Even allies from the Rome
Conference such as Germany have substantially altered their
position. Although U.S. participation would have been partially self-interested — limiting the chance that U.S. operations
would fall within the definition — it would also have served as
a valuable check. Furthermore, the U.S. renunciation of its signature would not have prevented its participation. The ICC still
considers the U.S. to be a signatory observer2 and in any case,
the proceedings of the Special Working Group on the Crime
of Aggression are open to all members of the United Nations.3
Other non-parties, such as China, have remained involved.

Rome Statute for the International
Criminal Court (ICC) in July 1998 placed four crimes
within the jurisdiction of the court — genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. Of these, the
crime of aggression remains inoperative. When negotiations
over the definition and jurisdictional conditions for the crime of
aggression deadlocked at Rome, the parties chose to table the
issue. Aggression was included, but its application is contingent
on the adoption of a definition by the states parties.1 This can
happen, at the earliest, during the first Review Conference of the
Rome Statute, to be held in 2009 or 2010.
In the intervening years, the Rome Statute has entered force
and the court has begun operation. The United States signed
the Rome Statute at the last possible moment — December 31,
2000 — and then renounced its signatory status one and one-half
years later. Meanwhile, negotiations on the definition of aggression have continued behind the scenes. Since 2002, however,
these negotiations have proceeded without the participation or
input of the United States. In that time, there has arguably been
a shift in the tenor of negotiations away from U.S. positions.
Provisions that received only minority support at Rome have
now been largely accepted by the parties to the ICC.
For opponents of the court, these developments raise the
distinct possibility that the ICC will adopt a definition of aggression that the United States considers unacceptable — an expansive definition without strict control by the Security Council.
Yet even for American supporters of the Court, the trend in the
negotiations is troubling. Excluding the Security Council from
the determination of whether aggression has occurred increases
the likelihood of a political clash between the Permanent Five
and the ICC that could prove highly damaging to the Court.
Lowering the threshold for criminal aggression risks diverting
the Court from serious war crimes and crimes against humanity
to making a potentially difficult political determination in naming an aggressor. An expansive definition could be formulated
to encompass legitimate actions in self-defense and potentially
criminalize humanitarian actions.
That adroit diplomatic maneuvering on the part of the United
States could have protected its preferences is at least a realistic
possibility. The United States was able to significantly influence
the negotiations at Rome on issues such as complementarity and
specified elements of crimes even though it ultimately failed to
join consensus. The emphasis at Rome on restraint and rigorous
he adoption of the

Historical Background
The criminalization of aggression in international law dates
to the International Military Tribunal (IMT) established at
Nuremburg following the Second World War, and to its counterpart, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Crimes
against peace — as aggressive war was charged at Nuremburg
— were further developed in Allied Military Tribunals conducted in Germany under Control Council Law 10.4 Since then,
however, there has been no further jurisprudence, and aggression was excluded from the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
In establishing the IMT, crimes against peace were included
largely out of fear that senior Nazi leaders might otherwise
escape punishment. Modern doctrines of command responsibility and joint criminal enterprise had yet to be developed to reach
such individuals. Ultimately, the Nuremburg Charter provided
for individual responsibility for:
Crimes against peace. Namely, planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation
of international treaties, agreements, or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.5

Significantly, this formulation included only wars of aggression,
which the prosecution argued had already been made criminal
by a variety of international instruments from the 1920s.
Because they were conducted against the backdrop of
the unquestionable aggression of the Nazi Conquests, the
Nuremberg jurisprudence provides only a few principles clearly.
A declaration of war was not required, but actual use of force
was. Although the IMT considered the occupation of Austria
and Czechoslovakia to be “aggressive in character,” they were
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“In negotiations, the parties continued to disagree
about whether the crime of aggression should apply to
any ‘act of aggression’ of sufficient gravity, or whether
the term ‘armed attack’ should be used. Support for any
continued use of the term ‘war of aggression,’
however, was minimal, and the majority favored the
broadest term of ‘act of aggression.’”
not considered to be instances of criminal aggressive war.6 The
motives of Germany and Japan — noting the goals of forcibly
acquiring territory and securing domination over other states —
were relevant. Crimes against peace were leadership crimes and
restricted to those at the policy-making level. Mere preparation
for war, however, was insufficient, and knowledge that the war
was aggressive was required.7
After the war, the principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal
were immediately recognized as part of international law by
the General Assembly of the new United Nations.8 The General
Assembly also began the process of developing a definition of
aggression9 and directed the International Law Commission
to develop a Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind. These two efforts occupied the majority
of the discussion on aggression in subsequent decades, although
the International Law Commission’s work never departed significantly from the Nuremberg formula.10
The General Assembly’s definition of aggression was finally
adopted in 1974 and constitutes the most significant alternate
touchstone to the Nuremberg precedents.11 It was not intended
to provide a basis for individual criminal responsibility, but to
provide guidance to the Security Council in determining state
responsibility. Although adopted by consensus, the definition
left unresolved significant differences relating to the intent
behind aggressive uses of force and aggression in wars of liberation. The superpowers and their allies wanted a high threshold
and an intent standard to insulate their own military operations,
while the developing states of the Nonaligned Movement sought
to include any possible use of force against them within its scope.
The definition hews very closely to the prohibition on the use of
force in the UN Charter, while also providing an illustrative list
of acts that would constitute aggression. No threshold of gravity
or particular motive is required, implying that any use of force
not authorized by the Charter would constitute aggression.

1999 and 2001; and since 2002 in the Special Working Group on
the Crime of Aggression established by the Assembly of States
Parties. Consistent disagreements have surrounded the role of
the Security Council in determining that a state act of aggression had occurred and the scope of the definition and threshold
of gravity.

Rome Conference
At Rome in 1998, negotiations deadlocked over the role
of the Security Council. The Permanent Five and a number of
supporters insisted that the court should only be able to proceed
in the wake of a Security Council determination that a state
act of aggression had occurred. Opponents of this position felt
that making the court dependent on a political decision by the
Security Council would destroy its independence, although a
majority favored a compromise if one could be reached. Part of
the debate hinged not on whether a Security Council finding of
aggression would be necessary for jurisdiction, but whether such
a determination would be reviewable at trial.
In debating aggression, the participants at Rome focused
on a three-option draft paper prepared by the final Preparatory
Committee in 1998.12 The first option essentially reproduced the
definition from the Nuremberg Charter, even maintaining the
language of Nuremberg, referring in square brackets to crimes
against peace and wars of aggression. The second option was
developed from a proposal by Egypt and Italy and adopted the
list of aggressive acts from Article 3 of the General Assembly
definition.13 Whether the list would be merely illustrative or
would constitute an exhaustive list of aggressive acts remained
under debate. The third option was developed from a German
proposal14 and sought to update the Nuremberg definition while
maintaining a high threshold for aggressive acts to become
criminal. Dispensing with the words “war of aggression,” the
German proposal used the term “armed attack” from Article 51
of the UN Charter.
Although no consensus definition was reached, the majority
of states supported the German option. The developing states
split, with only Middle Eastern states favoring the General
Assembly-inspired second option. Support for the straight incorporation of the Nuremberg definition was minimal. Later in the

Recent Negotiations and Issues
Negotiations to define aggression for the ICC have taken
place in three different fora — at the Rome Conference and its
Preparatory Committee; in the Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression of the Preparatory Commission on the ICC between
21

conference, the first and second options were dropped and states
were asked to support or oppose including the German definition. A majority still favored including the definition if a compromise could be reached on the role of the Security Council.
As the conference drew to a close, the Conference Bureau
placed a deadline on the definition of aggression, proposing that
it be excluded from the statute if a definition could not be agreed
on by the end of the day on July 13. At the time, however,
debate was focused on the question of whether jurisdiction over
core crimes would be automatic or on an opt-in basis for each
crime. Aggression was a less pressing issue and no agreement
was reached.

position was strongly supported by the United States, but did not
achieve a consensus.21 A significant number of states continued
to support either a General Assembly-based definition, or an
alternate low-threshold definition.22
In 2001, the debate returned to the role of the Security
Council. Various proposals were made to allow the Court to
proceed if the Security Council failed to act in 12 months, to
proceed on the basis of an advisory opinion from the ICJ,23 or
simply to act without recourse to the Security Council.24 The
United States and the other permanent members of the Security
Council continued to strongly oppose these proposals. The U.S.
position was that the Charter power to determine when an act of
aggression had occurred was granted exclusively to the Security
Council because it fell under Chapter VII, even if other bodies
had a role in peace and security generally.25

Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court
The task of defining aggression was passed to the Preparatory
Commission by Resolution F of the Rome Conference15 and
remained there until the Statute entered force in 2002. The
General Assembly-based definition was immediately reintroduced for consideration by a coalition of Middle Eastern

Assembly of States Parties
No definition was produced by the final session of the
Preparatory Commission in July 2002, at which point the
United States had already withdrawn from participation in the
Court. The first act of the Assembly of States Parties was to
establish a Special Working Group to continue the Preparatory
Commission’s work on aggression.26
The core debates of the previous efforts have continued, but
with a significant shift in the tone of negotiations. The discussions at the Assembly of States Parties have been based on
the consolidated definition that incorporates much more of the
General Assembly definition than previous consolidated texts.27
Remaining elements of the German proposal were reduced to
square brackets, the threshold of gravity for aggression was
altered to limit jurisdiction to acts that constitute “flagrant”
violations of the Charter, and an act of aggression was defined
as “an act referred to in United Nations General Assembly
resolution 3314 (XXIX).”28 The revised discussion paper, from
January 2007, goes even further — whether the definition
recommended to the Assembly will be based on the General
Assembly definition is no longer under debate.
In negotiations, the parties continued to disagree about
whether the crime of aggression should apply to any “act of
aggression” of sufficient gravity, or whether the term “armed
attack” should be used. Support for any continued use of the
term “war of aggression,” however, was minimal,29 and the
majority favored the broadest term of “act of aggression.”
Reference to the objectives of aggression — annexing or occupying territory — was first modified to make it merely illustrative and then effectively dropped in favor of referring to manifest violations of the Charter. A number of delegations even
opposed limiting the definition to manifest or flagrant breaches
of the UN Charter.30
By February 2007, even developed states, including France
and China, which had previously opposed using the General
Assembly definition, accepted it and were concerned only
with whether all or part of the definition would be included.
A general reference to the General Assembly resolution raises
potential problems as the definition allows the Security Council
to designate additional, unspecified acts as aggression. Many
developing states wanted to limit the reference to Articles 1 and
3 of the General Assembly definition, which would address the
legality concern of allowing the definition to be expanded, but
would also excise all references to the Security Council and the

“The emphasis at Rome
on restraint and rigorous definition ultimately
proved to the Court’s
advantage and probably
sped the ratification
of the Statute.”
states,16 while Germany reintroduced its proposed definition
in its original form.17 Russia brought back the Nuremberg
definition.18 Although attempts were made to integrate General
Assembly elements into the German formulation,19 the doctrinal
split among states between those preferring a high threshold
for aggression and those preferring an expansive definition
remained, as did the split between those favoring general definition and those who preferred an illustrative list of acts.
Germany made a strong effort to defend a high threshold,
emphasizing that even the General Assembly definition distinguishes between the crime of aggression and other acts of
aggression. Germany’s argument was that past instances of
unquestionable aggression share certain characteristics: “a
particular magnitude and dimension;”20 serious consequences,
such as loss of life and widespread destruction; and objectives
unacceptable to the international community, such as annexation, annihilation, and the deportation of populations. A broader
definition would draw the court into minor border conflicts and
skirmishes where a clear aggressor is difficult to determine. This
22

portion of the definition which distinguishes between the crime
of aggression and other acts of aggression.31

Although the delegations debated whether the Court should
proceed if the Security Council declines or is unable to make a
determination, there has been no debate about the weight of a
Security Council resolution that aggression has not occurred. It
is not clear under any of the formulations whether such a resolution would permanently prevent the Court from charging aggression, or if the Court could only be prevented from proceeding
through year-by-year resolutions invoking Article 16 of the
Rome Statute. Other procedural options, such as requiring a full
session of the Pre-Trial Chamber in order to proceed without the
Security Council have not been thoroughly discussed.

Outstanding Issues, Trends, and U.S. preferences
The trend in negotiations has been clearly away from the formulation of aggression favored by the United States, particularly
since the U.S. withdrawal from the Court. The United States
strongly favored a guaranteed role for the Security Council. The
United States also previously favored defining aggression in
part on the basis of the purpose and objectives of the aggressor.
During the negotiations in the 1970s on the General Assembly
definition, the United States and other European powers argued
that aggressive intent was closer to the customary law and the
Nuremberg precedents, and a better indication of aggression
than the first use of force. Such a focus would avoid introducing
the question of criminality in minor incidents and would prevent
the definition from applying to most U.S. operations that do not
seek to annex territory or seize resources.
None of these objectives has been advanced by the course
of negotiations to date. The draft definition supported by the

Conclusion
The Assembly of States Parties may prove no more successful than its predecessors in devising a definition of aggression
capable of meeting the demanding standards for amending the
statute.34 On the other hand, the role of the Security Council has
been the major sticking point in all of the previous attempts. Yet
in recent negotiations, less than ten state parties, including the
United Kingdom, France, Russia, Australia, Poland and China,

“While the threshold for aggression has been
lowered, developing the rules of procedure and elements
of crimes, which was a major U.S. interest at Rome,
has not been seriously discussed.”
majority of states has progressively lowered the threshold for the
crime of aggression from a war of aggression, to an armed attack
aimed at capturing territory, to any act of aggression in manifest
violation of the Charter. Any reference to particular aggressive
intentions has been all but removed, and the General Assembly
definition has been progressively incorporated, while its distinction between criminal aggression and other aggressive acts has
been ignored. In a definition based on the General Assembly
formula — in particular a definition based only on Articles 1 and
3 — the “manifest violation” requirement is the only provision
distinguishing insignificant border conflicts or even legal uses of
self-defense from acts of aggression.32 Because the purpose of
an action may not be considered, uses of force of questionable
legality but not motivated by aggressive intent — humanitarian intervention or anticipatory self-defense — will likely fall
under the proposed definition of aggression. This places great
weight on how the words “manifest violation” are ultimately
interpreted.
While the threshold for aggression has been lowered, developing the rules of procedure and elements of crimes, which was
a major U.S. interest at Rome, has not been seriously discussed.
The last draft of the elements of the crime of aggression was
prepared in 2002 and has not been modified since.33 These drafts
elements require no particular mens rea requirement and there
has been no discussion of potential procedural and evidentiary
issues.

remain insistent on a mandatory Security Council determination.
While the Assembly might be loathe to adopt a definition over
the votes of the permanent members, this may not be enough to
block adoption of an amendment, or even its ratification. There
appears to be a strong desire in the Assembly to produce a definition for adoption in 2009 or 2010. The ratification and entry
into force of the Rome Statute happened much more quickly
than many originally predicted. It is entirely conceivable that
the adoption and ratification of an amendment — even over the
opposition of the Permanent Five — may also proceed more
quickly than might be expected.
Should such a definition be adopted, a lower threshold for
aggression could present problems for the Court. The virtue of
a high-threshold definition is not that it reflects the international
consensus on the limits of the crime of aggression. From the
fact that many states have consistently advocated lower limits,
many states clearly believe that the crime of aggression extends
further. Rather, the virtue of a high-threshold definition is
that it would involve the Court in only those cases on which a
near consensus exists as to their criminality. A high-threshold
definition would keep the Court from being drawn into conflicts
where a clear aggressor cannot readily be identified and discourage states from attempting to use aggression charges as leverage
in relatively low-level conflicts. It would also minimize the
chance of a disagreement between the Court and the Security
Council regarding whether a particular case constituted aggres23

sion and would keep debates about the legality of humanitarian
or stability operations away from a Court primarily concerned
with individual responsibility. The recent disagreement between
the ICJ and the Yugoslav Tribunal over the scope of genocide
in Bosnia-Herzegovina35 demonstrates the problems that arise
when international courts and organizations disagree in their
characterization of a conflict.
Without the carrot of potentially joining the Court, the
United States would have had significantly less leverage than at
Rome, and likely could not have protected a role for the Security
Council. On the other hand, the United States could still have
significantly influenced negotiations on the margins, pushing
for a higher threshold and drawing attention to neglected issues
like the elements of the crime of aggression or evidentiary con-

cerns. Returning to the process now, although it would not give
the United States a vote on the definition, would still provide a
chance to shape opinions, particularly in maintaining a united
position among the Permanent Five.
If the Working Group maintains its plan to produce a draft
definition in 2008, one year before the Review Conference,
the Sixth Session of the Assembly of States Parties will be the
last significant chance to influence the definition. Whether it
chooses to join the Court or not, the United States will necessarily be involved as a permanent member of the Security Council
in determining when aggression has occurred, if the Security
Council is allocated that role. Given these circumstances, it
should not be on the sidelines while the Court’s definition is
being prepared.
HRB
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